
A closer look at a legacy technique that once promised seamless security—until it didn’t
When the internet exploded into a marketplace, battlefield, and everything in between, one of the biggest challenges became identity. How do you tell the difference between a legitimate user and a fraudster, especially when both show up from the same IP range, use the same browser, or even share similar behavior patterns?
Enter device fingerprinting, a technique that promised to silently track and identify devices by stitching together dozens of attributes—browser type, OS version, screen resolution, language settings, installed fonts, and more.
For a while, it seemed like magic. But the shine didn’t last.
This post examines how device fingerprinting came to dominate parts of fraud detection and risk management, why it’s now being re-evaluated (if not outright banned), and what’s replacing it.
Device fingerprinting refers to the collection of passive signals from a user’s browser or device to create a probabilistic “fingerprint”—an identifier that can be used to recognize the same user on repeat visits.
These signals often include:
Over time, fingerprinting evolved to include even more obscure identifiers like audio context quirks, GPU patterns, and battery stats.
Originally used for analytics and personalization, it quickly became a tool for fraud detection, user tracking, and authentication reinforcement.
In the early 2010s, device fingerprinting gained popularity for several reasons:
This was especially attractive in sectors like banking, online gaming, and ecommerce—anywhere reputation and behavioral continuity were valuable.
Despite its early promise, fingerprinting has proven problematic in several critical ways:
Fingerprinting is hard to detect and harder to block. As such, it’s often classified as covert tracking. Regulators and browser vendors have taken note:
(Source: https://webkit.org/blog/10078/full-third-party-cookie-blocking-and-more/)
A fingerprint is not a stable identifier. Just switching from portrait to landscape can change key parameters. Legitimate users get flagged as suspicious. Fraudsters spoof attributes to blend in.
That means more false positives and more ways for attackers to game the system.
To do it well, companies often rely on third-party vendors who maintain massive device graphs. These tools are costly and act as black boxes—difficult to audit, explain, or debug when things go wrong.
When the output of your identity layer is “70% match, high risk,” it becomes hard to trust and harder to act on.
Authentication should not depend on signals that users can’t see or control. It should not rely on probabilistic guesswork or questionable data collection practices.
Instead, more businesses are shifting to trusted device binding, which verifies identity through secure, deterministic methods:
This approach is not only privacy-preserving (no tracking or profiling required), but also resilient to spoofing and built for scale. It’s deterministic, explainable, and user-consented—no grey areas.
And it doesn’t require thousands of dollars per month in fingerprinting APIs to guess who someone might be.
Device fingerprinting had its moment. In a world without robust authentication alternatives, it made sense to cobble together signals and try to form a picture of user identity.
But those days are over.
What’s needed now are secure, consent-based methods that respect privacy, avoid false positives, and eliminate the tradeoff between safety and usability.
Authentication is not a guessing game anymore. It’s a trust contract—built on clear signals, transparent technology, and better tools.
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/05/every-browser-unique-results-panopticlick
https://webkit.org/blog/10078/full-third-party-cookie-blocking-and-more/
https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/firefox-protection-against-fingerprinting
https://developer.chrome.com/blog/reducing-user-agent/
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-63-2.pdf